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THE HAZARDS OF LEGAL FINE TUNING:
CONFRONTING THE FREE WILL PROBLEM

IN ELECTION LAW SCHOLARSHIP
Michael A. Fitts*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Few fields of legal scholarship have grown as rapidly over the
past few years as the study of election law and the political process.
While courts refrained from an extensive oversight of the electoral
system through the 1950s, that abstention has abated over time, beginning with the redistricting cases, accelerating with the passage
and implementation of the Voting Rights Act,' and continuing with2
review.
the development of more searching standards of judicial
While the level of scrutiny has since ebbed and flowed, especially in
the enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, the results of these interrelated developments are evident. Far more than was ever imaginable several decades ago, litigants are asking the judicial process to
draw the permissible limits of political activity.
Legal scholarship has undergone an even greater evolution-a
transformation that is the subject of this article. Armed with insights
from the rapidly developing social sciences, academics have sought
to clarify and push the judicial and regulatory envelope beyond existing doctrine, exploring in detail the political consequences of alternative regulatory programs. Suffice it to say that many articles on
constitutional law and the electoral process in recent years begin with
Robert G. Fuller, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania
School of Law; Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, Swarthmore College, Spring 1999. The author would like to thank Rick Valelly for
helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
2. For a good overview of this progression, see James A. Gardner, Liberty,
*

Community and the ConstitutionalStructure of PoliticalInfluence: A Reconsiderationofthe Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 893 (1997).
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an enunciation of a more general
political theory that legal interven3
tion should seek to implement.
This article speculates broadly about two types of challenges
raised by these generally positive judicial and scholarly developments. While others have noted many of these points in the context
of particular types of electoral interventions, this article seeks to link
them together in a general discussion of legal intervention into the
political process. In so doing, I take seriously the kind invitation of
Rick Hasen, our symposium organizer, to think creatively andtruth be told-provocatively about the study of election law. My
central, and admittedly somewhat mischievous, thesis is that the burgeoning legal scholarship on election law, of which I am a supporter
and admirer, has nevertheless illuminated two related difficulties.
These potential complications, which are empirical as well as normative, result from our greater scholarly exploration of the implications of existing legal structure on electoral outcomes and our attempts to fine tune the legal apparatus to improve those outcomes.
First, in exploring alternative regulations, scholars face the danger of systematically overestimating the significance of the legal apparatus--dwarfing soft variables, as it were. Given the synoptic
character of our real life political world, legal changes at the margin
are unlikely over time to have the result that academics, focusing on
a particular legal rule, predict. This familiar claim is related to, but
more general than, the observation that public choice models can
overstate the impact of the rules of the game. Given the necessary
limitations of rule-bound legal intervention, our attempts to oversee
and manage the electoral process, which invariably examine issues at
the causal margin, run the risk of overstating the significance and
precision of legal rules, as the political system invariably responds
systematically.
Secondly, and more importantly, our ambition to better understand and control regulation of the electoral process raises a related
normative problem. With our expanded focus, we may be subtly
3. In the past four years, we have also seen the arrival of the first two focused exclusively on the regulation of the electoral process. See SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS (1998); DANIEL LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES

AND MATERIALS (1995).
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undermining our willingness to accept the political process as an independent system charged with choosing the appropriate ends of
government. The more we seek to understand and manage electoral
rules in order to affect policy outcomes, the less we may reserve for
resolution by the political process itself.
Why would this be problem? In part, this normative concern
also reflects a judgment that our complicated political processes have
more ways of adapting to changes than we at first think. But, more
importantly, this uneasiness stems from a suspicion that no single
and precise theory of democratic group rights can be articulated for
our diverse society; indeed, the "genius of American politics" 4 may
well be our acceptance of a degree of moral ambiguity. In other
words, we need to be humble about our factual as well as our normative powers. To the extent that this is true, as we seek to define with
ever greater precision the appropriate inputs to democratic decisionmaking, we run the risk of losing the necessary equivocation surrounding the meaning of democratic rule.
These related complications are what I broadly term the "free
will problem," a reference to the tension in criminal law between legal standards of moral responsibility and the increasing psychiatric
and medical understanding of human action and motivation. 5 According to criminal law scholars, courts are less likely to hold legally
or morally "responsible" an individual whose actions are "explained"
in terms of psychological causation and pathology.6 To draw the
analogy to the political process: the more we understand how the
rules of the game affect the substantive outcomes in politics, the
more we may run the risk of losing a proper respect for the

4. DANIEL BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1-2 (1953).

5. In the criminal law context, the expansion in knowledge of the internal
mechanics of the human mind has tended to undermine concepts of free will
and moral responsibility for human actors.
6. For a discussion of this issue, see DEBORAH W. DENNO, BIOLOGY AND
VIOLENCE: FROM BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD 534, 536 (1990). This connection, I

freely concede, is not logically required. See Stephen Morse, Brain and
Blame, 84 GEO. L.J. 527, 531-37 (1996). See generally, MICHAEL MOORE,

(1984) (proposing
that psychiatry and the law share similar views of the human mind). See infra
text accompanying notes 55-57.
LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP
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complicated and interactive functioning of the political process itself,
that is, its free will.
Section II of this article discusses the background of judicial intervention in the political process. Sections III and IV explore in
detail the factual and normative conundra mentioned above. Finally,
Section V describes two old approaches to politics-pluralism and
political parties-that seemed to accommodate some of these tensions.
One final caveat. As I freely concede, the strains I discuss are
not preordained. Nor are they usually even negative. I identify them
not to redirect the goals of scholarship, but rather to suggest reasons
why it should be circumspect, especially as we seek to fine tune any
legal intervention. In this sense, readers should understand the argument principally as a plea for intellectual and professional humility.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Old Days
There was a time when judicial doctrine, and to a lesser extent
legal scholarship, viewed the political process as much more outside
the legal terrain. A variety of traditional doctrines sustained this deference. The most important, of course, was the political question
doctrine, which insulated a series of political decisions from judicial
review. The assumption was that the political process had a constitutionally protected status that the courts were not to challenge.
Analogous doctrines, such as abstention and standing, also served to
insulate the political process from direct judicial second-guessing.
This judicial stance was related to, and in some sense an outgrowth of, the distinction drawn between the common law mode of
decision-making and legislative and political processes. For many
years, courts treated common law judicial processes as a morally
"neutral" form of incremental policymaking, despite the absence of
popular accountability. 7 When courts left this presumptively
7. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,63
U. CHI. L. REv. 877, 894-97 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REV. 741, 754, 769-71 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, On
Analogical Reasoning]; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
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impartial domain, however, they were supposedly encroaching upon
a qualitatively different moral system, over which they lacked comparative intellectual competence as well as normative legitimacy.
Democratic theory, though not well developed, provided the substantive validity for this separate network. To this extent, judicial
was presumptively illegitimate, as
oversight of the political process
8
well as potentially incoherent.
The Legal Process school, identified principally with the work
of Hart and Sachs, 9 reflected a similar deference, though it incorporated a much more dynamic approach to legal structure and judicial/legislative interactions. Proponents understood that political
processes were not distinct from law, and that the common law was
not the only area in which strong judicial oversight was appropriate.
At the same time, while adherents supported the expansion of legal
they did not purport to deintervention beyond the common law,
10
velop a general theory of democracy.
B. The New PublicLaw
The legal system has evolved significantly over the years.
Among other changes, the decline of the abstention doctrine and the
political question doctrine, as well as expanded standing rules, have
led the courts to confront a variety of issues affecting politics that
heretofore were beyond their reach. Three familiar areas illustrate
the overall trend.
REv. 873,885 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy].
8. For a general description of early viewpoints of the legislative process
within the legal community, see Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Po-

liticalPartyPerspective Civic Virtue Reform of the Legislative Process, 136 U.
PA. L. REv. 1567, 1569-76 (1988).
9. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
10. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC

POLICY 395-98 (1995) (describing the legal process perspective); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation ScholarshipandPedagogy in the
Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 691 (1987) (explaining and

critiquing legal process theory).

See also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,

RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 38-41 (1984) (reviewing the basic con-

cepts and problems of legal process theory).
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The first major change occurred when courts began to scrutinize
the political process in the redistricting and gerrymandering cases.
While the political question doctrine had originally insulated these
topics from judicial second-guessing, in Baker v. Carr" and its progeny the courts began the complicated task of reviewing the drawing
courts
of district lines. Few other judicial decisions have placed the
12
question.
political
a
fundamental
or
in the middle of as basic
The second area, the passage of the Voting Rights Act, 13 continued the judicial oversight by redefining the relationship of the courts
to the political process. Through both traditional and dynamic
statutory construction of the Act, the courts sought to establish a
standard for evaluating the appropriate participation and influence of
African-Americans. These changes initially covered voter access
rules, such as poll taxes and literacy tests, but ultimately included the
restructuring of district representation, such as multimember districts. With the passage of the 1982 amendments, 14 courts were
faced with defining the permissible limits of racially polarized voting
and vote dilution. 15
The third major area of increased electoral debate has been in
the campaign finance context. Here, most of the innovative thinking
has occurred in legal scholarship, rather than in judicial doctrine. In
Buckley v. Valeo,' the Supreme Court limited legislative and judicial
intervention through a general presumption that spending one's own
political money constituted protected speech, thereby thwarting
much legislative or judicial fine tuning of the proper limits of campaign activity.
Legal scholars, on the other hand, have not observed such jurisdictional boundaries. Given the potentially corrosive influence of
money on elections and the absence of any textual constitutional
11. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12. For the next thirty years the courts were forced to decide the appropriate
numerical size of districts, as well as the drawing of district lines to protect political parties and other potentially threatened groups. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
14. Voting Rights Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
15. See id.
16. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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clarity, scholars have offered an eclectic group of strategies for filling in the constitutional lacunae and alleviating different types of
political inequalities. These proposals have included stricter regulation of campaign contributions, volunteer activity, political speech,
newspaper endorsements, and public organizing, as well as the creation of elaborate types of political voucher systems and federal subsidies. 17 Indeed, since the concept of political equality is ultimately a
normative one, 18 some scholars have affirmatively argued for government subsidization of particularly "underrepresented" political
positions will not be "adequately" inphilosophies, for fear that such
19
debate.
private
any
in
cluded
These developments have transformed the scholarly landscape.
If academics once gave much greater respect to the political process,
they now understand with ever greater precision the impact of our
structural choices. 20 More importantly, with such understanding,
there is a reasonable impulse to fine tune the extent and nature of
electoral regulation. Two types of issues are worth highlighting: (1)
causal complexity, and (2) normative complexity. Both relate to the
synoptic and adaptive character of our real world political processes.

17. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Creditingthe Voters: A New Beginningfor
Campaign Finance, in READER INAMERICAN POLITICS (Walter Burnham ed.,
1995); Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of Money, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS 19-24
(1996); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter:A ConstitutionalPrinciple
of CampaignFinance,94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1252 (1994); Richard Hasen,
Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An EgalitarianPublic Choice Defense of
CampaignFinance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Daniel Lowenstein,
On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18
HoFsTRA L. REV. 301, 355-60 (1989). For a general critique of campaign reform proposals, see Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic
Consequencesof CampaignFinanceReform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996).
18. See PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY 6 (1990).
19. See OWEN Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 80 (1996); CASS
SUNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
20. Undoubtedly the most disturbing example is found in the voting rights
area, where poll taxes, voting tests, and multimember districts all have pervasive effects on the racial makeup of the electorate and their representatives.
See, e.g., CHANDLER DAVIDSON & BERNARD GROFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO

QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofnan
eds., 1994). A political system rigged to disenfranchise minorities through
such mechanisms has pervasive and perverse effects on our democratic ideal.
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III. SCHOLARLY TENSIONS: CAUSAL COMPLEXITY

The first issue is sometimes mentioned, but bears repeating. It is
the problem of assessing over time the political impact of changes in
the legal rules. As we have explored legislative intervention in ever
greater detail, we run the risk of overestimating our ability to predict
what the political outcome of changing the legal structure will be.
At first, this fear may seem odd; one of the underlying goals of
this line of scholarship has been to improve understanding of the nuanced impact of legal structure on the political process. Our earlier
and somewhat unreflective deference to the political system lacked
any real appreciation for the complex nature and meaning of popular
will. Yet, as we undertake this management project, we run the risk
of overstating the causal impact of legal intervention. Our exploration of changes in legal rules ordinarily focuses in one directionhow a particular policy affects the political system. In the process,
we can tend to downplay the many ways in which the political
process, in all its complexity and fluidity, can, in response to a
change, distort and redirect the impact of a legal innovation. -'
In most cases, the legal system views the first part of this causal
loop as forward-looking interdisciplinary scholarship; for example,
assessing what the impact of multimember or single-member districts
will be on the election of African-Americans. The legal system often
treats the second part-the systemic response of the political and legal environment over time-as beyond immediate legal analysis,
since it works through other statutes or doctrines.
We might conceive of this dynamic as the political counterpart
of the Coase Theorem, which first showed how the significance of
legal property assignments frequently turned on the ease with which
actors could trade or renegotiate initial distributions in private economic markets. 22 Based on an extensive analysis of transaction
costs, scholars have come to appreciate how legal rules are often effective only to the extent that they cannot be renegotiated. What at
first seemed an inviolate system of property rights turned into a

21. In other words, politics can produce a Heisenberg-type effect, where the
legal rule changes the politics of the environment in which it is applied.
22. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960).
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complicated scheme of renegotiation and trades, as those most interested in the right sought to reallocate its incidence.
In the election law context, there is an analogous concern that
people may circumvent legal rules through an informal dynamic-in
this case, a synoptic and reactive private political process. When the
courts change the marginal rules of the game in one area, such as in
redistricting, burdened political actors can easily respond by doing an
end run around the rule or pursuing relief in an alternative legal context.23 Adding to this complexity is the fact that changes may systematically galvanize affected actors, either positively, giving the
intervention greater force,24 or negatively, in a process Mark Roe has
recently termed "backlash. ' 2 5 The space to fully discuss these repercussions is not available here, but some familiar cases are illustrative.
The first example involves gerrymandering. While Baker v.
Carr2 6 and its progeny revealed gross inequities in the number of
voters placed in legislative districts, the ultimate impact of the legal
intervention became quite difficult to control, as the political process
used its newfound legal obligation as a means to gerrymander on behalf of political parties and to protect incumbency. The attempt to
equalize the "vote," which had originally seemed formally straightforward, had quite unforeseen effects. The courts were thus faced
with a complicated process of determining how to protect the substantive equality of the different group interests.2 7 Given this
23. To draw the Coasian analogy, those most interested or burdened by the
outcome may have the greatest incentive to respond.
24. See, e.g., MORTON HOROWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT

OF JUSTICE: A CRITCAL ISSUE (1998); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
(1997). But see GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1993) (questioning
whether courts can produce change without popular mobilization and participation).

25. Legal scholars or courts focused on a particular legal rule, or applying a

particular but necessarily simplified model from the social sciences, may miss
this dynamic-a type of political theory of the second-best. For one attempt to
assess this dynamic, see Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 217
(1998).
26. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
27. See Sanford Levinson, Gerrymanderingand the Brooding Omnipresence of ProportionalRepresentation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L.
REv. 257, 269-70 (1985); Daniel Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest

for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest. Elusive or Illusory?, 33

UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1985); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan
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political reaction, as one commentator has observed, "a persistent
awareness exists [to this day] that the infirmities at the core of the
political process, which the reapportionment cases of the 1960s
promised to cure, continue to be alive
and resistant to the doctrinal
28
Court."
Supreme
the
of
interventions
The racial redistricting cases 29 illustrate a similar type of dynamic. The first legal interventions triggered by the Voting Rights
Act3 °--scrutinizing poll taxes, literacy tests, and multimember districts-markedly increased the number of African-Americans who
were able to vote and elected to office. 3 1 The second line of cases
enforcing the Voting Rights Act, on the other hand, sought to confront the difficult problems of racially polarized voting and vote dilution.32 As we have seen, the political system reacted here, as the
pursuit of racial diversity seemed to have undermined the interests of
the Democratic party in at least some cases, and thereby, possibly,
the substantive policy interests of African-Americans. While the
initial foray into the political process was relatively straightforward,
the indirect impact of the latter innovation was far more complicated.33
Finally, in the campaign regulation context, we find similar synoptic responses, even though Buckley v. Valeo 34 proved a major obstacle to serious legislative and judicial intervention. Despite the
tortured holding of Buckley,35 the development of Political Action
Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1325, 1325-29 (1987).
28. Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial
Review ofPoliticalFairness,71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1644 (1993).
29. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
31. See James E. Alt, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and
White Voter Registration in the South, in QUIET REvOLUTION IN THE SOUTH:
THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 351 (Chandler David-

son & Bernard Grofiman eds., 1994).
32. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
33. In effect, political actors responded to the new legal rule-a type of political renegotiation, as it were-leading to unanticipated results. See Issacharoff, supra note 28, at 1645 (concluding that, even in the race context, "the
promised control of partisan manipulation of the political process has not occurred").
34. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
35. The Court held constitutional the individual contribution limits, the disclosure and reporting provisions, and the public financing scheme of the Fed-
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Committees ("PACs"), which proliferated under the distinction between contribution36 and expenditure, has provided their own type of
political override.
Moreover, the voluminous scholarship criticizing the opinion in
Buckley illuminates some of the same scholarly concerns. As noted
above, the proposals for legal intervention have contemplated the use
of vouchers, federal subsidization of parties, federal subsidization of
challengers, general limitations on certain types of political activity,
as well as subsidization of particular viewpoints. 37 While virtually
every proposal has thoughtful arguments to be made on its behalf,
taken as a group, they represent what two of the most prominent
and Pamela
authors in the election law area, Samuel Issacharoff
38
industry."
"cottage
a
as
Karlan, recently described
What is going on? Issacharoff and Karlan claim that critics often seek to "enforce" what can only be described as "some immaculate vision of politics." 39 Unfortunately, as they point out:
"[R]aising and spending political money takes place inside of institutional structures, such as the two party system, territorial districting, restrictive ballot access laws, and a variety of incumbency protection practices.., that powerfully affect how that money is raised,
by whom it gets raised, and where it goes.",40 In this milieu, the free
flow of money is the equivalent of a "hydraulic system"; people can
at least partially circumvent most changes in the rules through the
movement of cash or other things of value. Echoing some of these
same sentiments, a recent study of PACs and special interest groups
suggested that any attempt to limit PAC contributions might actually
increasecongressional incentives to engage in wasteful "pork barrel"
spending.4 1 Issacharoff and Karlan suggest that interventions in the
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971, but held "constitutionally infirm" the
limitations on expenditures provisions. See id. at 143.
36. See, e.g., LARRY SABATO, PAC POWER (1985); Richard L. Hall &
Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of
Bias in CongressionalCommittees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 797 (1990).
37. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

38. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
39. See id.; see also Smith, supra note 17, at 1049 (arguing that reform proposals are based on faulty assumptions).
40. Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 38.
41. See ROBERT M. STEIN & KENNETH N. BICKERS, PERPETUATING THE
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campaign finance context be simple and42straightforward in order to
maximize chances for long term success.
Of course, this is not to imply that we should not intervene, only
that, when we do, we should be appropriately circumspect. Due to
the synoptic character of politics, predictions are far more precarious;
than one initially expects. As the Coase Theorem showed in the case
of private economic markets, we may systematically underestimate
the ability and willingness of private actors-in this instance, in the
political process-to redirect legal intervention.
IV. SCHOLARLY TENSIONS: NORMATIVE COMPLEXITY

This leads to the second and more fundamental point. In addition to the need to be circumspect about the impact of legal intervention, we also need to be cautious about our ability to resolve the
normative conflicts implicit in any fine tuning of that intervention. 43
Based on current scholarship, we understand, far more than in
the past, the nuanced impact of special interest groups, of lobbying,
of public opinion, of judicial review, of campaign contributions and
expenditures, and of informal contacts, on the performance of government. Moreover, we appreciate how the structure of government
affects outcomes: rules on the raising of money, on who may vote,
on campaign advertising, on redistricting, and on campaign fundraising. Armed with these insights, it is too easy to assume that we
can and must resolve all the normative conflicts implicit in these
choices. 44
PORK BARREL-POLICY SUBSYSTEMS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 149

(1995). The authors claim that: "[I]n the absence of other reforms that curtail
the actions of subsystems, campaign finance reform may lead to the type of
universalizing behavior that produces inefficient and profligate federal spending." Id.
42. See Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 38.
43. Much like ajury, whose decisions the public accepts in part because the
legal system does not scrutinize its precise internal workings, see Albert W.
Altschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CH. L. REv. 153, 154 (1989),

political systems subjected to greater causal understanding are subject to more

public and scholarly second-guessing.
44. As discussed above, however, the political process exhibits a quite
complicated systemic and interactive quality, where changes in legal structure
and inputs can cause underlying changes in values and preferences, as well as
incite simple "backlash," within the public at large. See Roe, supra note 25, at
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One example of this dynamic can be found in the scholarly response to the redistricting cases. While the first cases simply looked
at impediments to the right and ability to vote, the second wave confronted the difficult question of what constituted an equally effective
vote for minority groups and other losers in the political process.
The resulting scholarship has sought to confront some of the most
basic questions on the meaning of democracy: should our system
give groups "an equally effective vote," a right to "take turns at setting the substance of government policy," a right to "equal access to
political influence," or simply a right not to have their collective will
"frustrated"? 46 Equality of the vote cannot be a "mere euphemism
for political defeat at the polls," 47 but what is it? Unfortunately, to
the extent inputs and outputs are conflated, there is often no practical
difference between an analysis of voting rights and the quality of the
substantive decisions of government.
Some of the scholarship criticizing Buckley v. Valeo 48 has confronted similar questions. Once one concedes the obvious existence
of huge "inequalities" in political influence, the question arises as to
what type of influence is appropriate. Needless to say, the concept of
equality is an inherently normative one.49 This discussion has often
turned into a debate over what are the appropriate inputs as well as
outputs of government. As Issacharoff and Karlan have warned, the
danger is that proposals will simply seek to enforce the author's
50
"immaculate vision of politics."
While such issues cannot be avoided, the ultimate question is
whether, in a society as normatively diverse as ours, we can resolve
all these conflicts through legal rules. As Stephen Holmes has
1-2. This goal is not a recapitulation of the civic virtue and "real world" critique of public choice analyses, but rather a recognition that the political process will respond to intervention in self-interested, ideological, as well as problem solving, ways that transform the context in which the original intervention
was made.
45. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
46. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 137 (1986); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 565-76 (1964). See also LANI GLTINER, THE TYRANNY OF THE
MAJORITY 104 (1994).

47.
48.
49.
50.

Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971).
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Issacharoff& Karlan, supranote 38.
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observed, "in a liberal social order,... the basic normative framework.., must be able to command the loyalty of individuals and
groups with widely differing self-understandings and conceptions of
personal fulfillment." As a result, "[t]heorists of justice can achieve

[their principal aims] only if they steer clear of irresolvable metaphysical disputes."'"
Admittedly, an underlying theory or political philosophy is always necessary to justify any decision about the form of the electoral
process. The real question is how much comprehensiveness and de-

tail must that theory possess and serve to implement. As we have
observed in the extensive debates over Arrow's Theorem, Civic Republicanism, economic efficiency, and natural rights philosophy,

scholars' attempts to articulate a universally accepted vision of democracy have met little success. In a society as socially and politically diverse as ours, we are unlikely to achieve a consistent and

comprehensive theory of democracy, that is, a single and accepted
system for aggregating individual rights into a collective democratic

will.
To the extent this is true, some type of political black box, a
52
pragmatic and evolving political process, is ultimately necessary.
Justice Frankfurter implicitly recognized this conundrum in his famous-and criticized-admonition that the legal process should not
be in the business of choosing "among competing theories of political philosophy., 5 3 While critics have rightfully pointed out that the
electoral structures we choose necessarily involve an implicit choice
as between political philosophies, defenders of Frankfurter can make
the opposite claim; politics cannot simply be a choice between right
51. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 203-04 (1995). See
also JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT] (suggesting that how people reason is

a function of the particular social role in which they find themselves); John
Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
17 (1987) (calling for the "remov[al] from the political agenda [of] the most
divisive issues, pervasive uncertainty and serious contention about which must
undermine the bases of social cooperation").
52. See Michael Fitts, Back to the Future: The EnduringTensions Revealed
in the Supreme Court's Treatment of Political Parties, in THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS (David Hope ed., forthcoming 2000).
53. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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and wrong political philosophies. More to the point, courts and academics seeking to resolve the structure of our electoral system should
not assume that all choices are capable of normative legal resolution.
Some important subset of decisions needs to be left to the political
process itself.
Such moral ambiguity may well be "the genius of American
democracy"; 54 it creates the normative slack in which we accommodate our alternative substantive visions of American society and its
politics. Of course, no one has suggested that we have already
reached the point at which this moral conflict undermines democratic
legitimacy; the point is simply that we should recognize the value in
scholarly circumspection.
This organic quality of politics underscores the analogy between
this issue and the free will debate in criminal law. Over the years,
finding a causal factor for human behavior has often served to absolve individuals of moral or criminal responsibility. The more we
understand what social or biological factors "explain" the behavior,
the less likely we are to hold the individual responsible.55 Society is
less likely to "blame" a criminal who suffers from a disadvantaged
upbringing or psychiatrically identifiable syndromes. Yet, as critics
have pointed out, the fact that some underlying social or psychological fact can partially explain a human decision does not mean that
moral responsibility cannot attach to other factors, such as human
choice. The forces of the human mind comprise an infinity of "butfor" causes. 56 This web of influences constitutes moral agency, the
human will. Drawing the analogy to the political context, the attempt to simplify and ultimately reduce politics into theories of segregable inputs downplays the work of politics itself-at least politics
57
in its polycentric and pragmatic form.

54. BooRSTIN, supra note 4.
55. See DENNO, supranote 6, at 536.
56. See Morse, supra note 6.
57. See, e.g., Rogers Smith, IfPolitics Matters,6 STuD. iNAM. POL. DEv. 1
(1992). In this sense, the whole may be greater than the sum of its parts.
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V. MoRE DEFERENTIAL APPROACHES TO POLITICS

Two older theoretical approaches capture at least part of this
58
synoptic intuition: (1) pluralism and (2) political parties.
A. Pluralism
Traditional pluralists understood the complexity of real world
political interactions and the normative appeal of a theoretical system
that accommodated them over time. In the famous words of Charles
Lindblom, "No person, committee, or research team, even with all
the resources of modem electronic computation, can complete the
analysis of a complex problem. Too many interacting values are at
stake, too many possible alternatives, too many consequences to be
traced through an uncertain future." 59 For Lindblom, the "intelligence of democracy" is the "partisan mutual adjustments" of complex political interaction. Such processes "achieve a coordination
superior to an attempt at central coordination, which is often so complex as to lie beyond any coordinator's competence. 60
The normative theory underlining Lindblom's descriptive analysis is quite pragmatic. The complex process of "mutual adjustment"
is supposed to ensure that interested actors will debate and pressure
for their preferred outcomes. In this sense, the evolution of interests
and ideas held by the public should help resolve the rough structure
and substance of political decisions. The end result should be a mutually attractive accommodation.
Interestingly, law and economics scholars have offered a parallel
justification for some types of interest group politics. They argue
that interest groups often organize and have impact roughly
commensurate to their underlying commitment to and investment in
issues. 6 1 While critics have rightfully questioned the robustness and
58. Most law-related attempts to understand politics generalize from very
narrow and modeled normative frameworks, whether they be individual rights,
civic virtue, economic efficiency, equality or simply "good" social policy.
While each of these analytic and normative slices captures part of the dynamic
of politics, each misses its synoptic evolutionary character, as reflected in some
of the older literatures.
59. Charles Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADVOC.
REv. 517, 518, 523 (1979).
60. Id. at 523.
61. See, e.g., DONALD A. WrrrMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE:
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potential biases of the actual practice, 62 the assumption is that a
pragmatic form of interactive social decision-making will arise.
Indeed, legal scholars have advanced an analogous defense of
common law decision-making, the most original form of judicial reasoning. Common law processes lack the abstractness and normative
clarity achieved by most philosophical theories. At the same time,
by grounding decisions in a "rough empiricism" and "test[ing] ...in
a variety of [real world] circumstances," they do offer a rough and
pragmatic form of local justice. 63 Proponents argue that "[t]he core
idea [ of [the] common law" reflects a sensible recognition 64
of "the
argument."
abstract
of
distrust
[a]
and
reason,
human
of
limits
B. PoliticalParties
The traditional justification offered for strong political parties
captures a second type of pragmatic political approach. As I have
argued elsewhere, the theory of strong parties serves to help resolve
one of the central dilemmas of constitutional law-defining majority
will-without continued need for explicit judicial line-drawing.
Through their competition for public support, a type of political invisible hand, parties serve to transform a legal system focused on individual voters and individual rights into a collective
(1995); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J.
ECON. 371 (1983).
WHY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT

62. For the classic criticism, which itself has been subject to much debate,
see MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982).
63. Strauss, supra note 7, at 892. See also Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics,andthe RationalForce of LegalArgument by
Analogy, 109 HARV.L.REV. 923, 926 (1996); SuNsTEN, LEGAL REASONING

AND POLITICAL CONFLICT, supra note 51, at 62-100; Sunstein, On Analogical
Reasoning, supra note 7, at 746. But see Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings,
145 U. PA. L. REv. 57, 72-76 (1996) (arguing that analogical reasoning in law
does not exist).
64. Strauss, supranote 7, at 894. To this extent, the common law approach
may reflect a belief in bounded rationality. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS
OF MAN 198-99 (1957). Pursuing a parallel line of argument, Dan Lowenstein
has examined the conservative argument in favor of allowing the state political
process to resolve conflicts over racial redistricting. His assumption is that, at
the current state of the debate, traditional political resolution of this vexing racial issue may achieve a better and fairer result over the long run. See Daniel
Hays Lowenstein, You Don't Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial GerrymanderingCases, 50 STAN. L. REv. 779 (1998).
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In the- classic words of E.E.
decision-making process. 65
Schattschneider, "political parties created democracy and... modem
66
democracy is unthinkable save in terms of... [political] parties.
Thus, while the legal system indirectly creates and protects parties
through legal regulation, the informal competition between rarties
for support serves to help define the meaning of majority will.
This is not the place to defend any particular theory of parties or
pluralism. Certainly, parties do not magically create an optimal political "market," just as the private invisible hand of the economic
market does not magically produce efficiency. 68 There is extensive
scholarship on the problems with, and the need to reform, political
69
parties, including determining their appropriate number and form.
At the same time, the theory of political parties is important
analytically. The competition between parties serves to implement a
popular mandate without necessarily involving the courts in resolving the meaning of the democratic vote at every juncture." It is not
surprising, therefore, that very few legal academics, except for the
usual suspects, spend any time analyzing the performance of parties.
Even though democracy is "unthinkable" in their absence, the value

65. The structure of our party system also enables such resolution to be updated more easily as our political culture evolves. See Fitts, supra note 52.
66. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOvERNMENT 1 (1942).
67. Unlike legal intervention in other contexts, however, parties perform
most of these roles without direct judicial or governmental oversight.
Schattschneider implied this in his classic statement that "democracy is not to
be found within the parties, but between them." See id. at 60.
68. For the classic description of the problems with monopolistic parties,
see V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLMCS INSTATE AND NATION (1949).
69. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and the
Republicansfrom PoliticalCompetition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331. Of course,

just as our property rights system serves to regulate the private market, a host
of legal rules serve to condition how "private political parties" operate, thereby
forcing the legal system to confront indirectly many of the difficult issues it
may seek to avoid. See Fitts, supra note 52.
70. For one example of scholarship looking to ensure that parties are robust
and focused, but which purports not to decide the outcomes of that competition, see generally Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: PartisanLockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643

(1998).
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of political parties to the democratic debate may be a peculiarly extra-legal one.
VI. CONCLUSION

Most of the points advanced in this article ultimately reduce to a
simple proposition-the need- for intellectual and professional humility. In light of the complex history of electoral regulation, our
ability to predict the impact of legal changes is less than we originally expected. We also are unlikely to achieve a normatively precise theory of democracy that will instruct and resolve all of the
heated normative debates over the regulation of the electoral process.
Admittedly, these observations are quite general. But my pursuit of
this level of abstraction is quite intentional. By keeping the discussion on a fairly high level, I have sought to avoid a debate on the ultimate merits of particularinterventions, and instead focused on the
issues systemically. 7 '
No particular political agenda lies behind this effort. Intervention into the political process can take many forms and further the
interests of a wide variety of different constituencies, liberal as well
as conservative. 72 I agree with almost all of the legal interventions
discussed in this article, even in their redirected form. Obviously,
the question is not whether we should continue studying and regulating the electoral process, but how. Whatever the purposes of future intervention recommended by scholars, we need to be appropriately circumspect in our prediction of its ultimate outcome.

71. For the record, despite these caveats, I agree with most of the interventions discussed in the paper.
72. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see LOWENSTEIN, supranote
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